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ABSTRACT
An investigative journalist describes how grassroots
environmental struggles in three different communities—
in
Oklahoma,
Florida,
and
Louisiana—contain
similarities that reveal larger patterns about the long path
communities must follow to achieve environmental justice.
Residents living near industry fence lines cannot depend
on regulators or industry to protect them, the author
concludes, but must gather their own evidence of
pollution’s effects. Environmental justice—in the form of
reduced pollution or relocation from dangerous plants—is
possible. But, as the case studies show, such resolution is
achieved only after years of struggle and persistence.
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I.

INTRODUCTION1

In Ponca City, Oklahoma, black mist from a carbon
plant rained on people, pets and lawns for so long,
∗

Ronnie Greene, an investigative reporter with The Center for
Public Integrity in Washington, is author of NIGHT FIRE: BIG OIL,
POISON AIR, AND MARGIE RICHARD’S FIGHT TO SAVE HER TOWN, and
numerous shorter works investigating environmental injustice in
communities across the United States. A nationally honored author
and journalist formerly with THE MIAMI HERALD, Greene is pursuing
a Masters in Nonfiction Writing from The Johns Hopkins University.
The author would like to thank Traci Lynne Timmons of Barry
University School of Law for her assistance on this article.
This article is based predominantly on the author’s
experiences as a journalist in the field. As an investigative journalist
for over twenty years, the author is able to provide a longitudinal
study of the challenges confronting environmental justice
communities.
Although the earlier articles were published
individually when written, this piece collects and analyzes
overarching observations of commonalities reflected in the challenges
facing environmental justice communities. It allows the author an
opportunity to synthesize recurrent themes and focus the reader on
systemic challenges. The earlier works inform the author and serve
as the foundation for the factual observations and subsequent
reflections on the whole. Ronnie Greene, Community Coated in
Black—Until Citizens Fought Back, The Center for Public Integrity
(Nov.
7,
2011),
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/11/07/7297/community-coated-blackmist-until-citizens-fought-back [hereinafter Greene, Community
Coated in Black]; Ronnie Greene, Small-town Residents Living on
Deadly Ground, THE MIAMI HERALD (May 3, 2008) [hereinafter
Greene, Small-town Residents]; Ronnie Greene, Tiny Toxic Florida
Town Takes on a Corporate Goliath, THE MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 15,
2010) [hereinafter Greene, Toxic Florida Town]; Ronnie Greene,
Residents, Lockheed Martin on Brink of Settling Contamination Case,
THE MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Greene, Residents,
Lockheed]; RONNIE GREENE, NIGHT FIRE: BIG OIL, POISON AIR, AND
MARGIE RICHARD'S FIGHT TO SAVE HER TOWN (2008) [hereinafter
GREENE, NIGHT FIRE].
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residents filed twenty binders of complaints with
regulators.2 A Native American mother had her child ride
her bike, with training wheels, inside to avoid the mist.3
A teenager kept his prized white Dallas Cowboys jersey
wrapped in plastic.4 State inspectors documented the
pollution for more than a decade, but levied few financial
sanctions against industry.5
In Tallevast, Florida, an underground plume of
toxins seeped into the community’s groundwater for
decades before detection, billowing into a 200-acre brew of
cancer-causing TCE and other hazards.6 The historic
black community, built by turn-of-the-century turpentine
workers, only discovered the plume by chance;
government and industry didn’t tell the residents.7 Now,
Tallevast threatens to wither from pollution years after
residents began charting cancer cases with stick pins on a
board.8
In Norco, Louisiana, explosions from a Shell
chemical plant and neighboring refinery killed citizens in
the streets and workers in the plant.9 For decades,
The plant the author is referring to is Continental Carbon, a
carbon plant located in Ponca City, Oklahoma. See Continental
Carbon,
Ponca
City,
Oklahoma,
Plant,
http://www.continentalcarbon.com/company/ponca-city-directions.asp
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
2

The “mist” the author is referencing is “carbon black,” a
product used in tires, rubber and plastic goods. Carbon black is a
“carbon in the form of colloidal particles that are produced by
incomplete combustion or thermal decomposition of gaseous or liquid
hydrocarbons under controlled conditions.” See Carbonblack.org,
What is Carbon Black?, http://www.carbon-black.org/what_is.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
3
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Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.
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Tallevast Information Center, Tallevast, Florida & Lockheed
Martin, http://www.tallevast.info/tallevast (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
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Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1.

BUREAU OF ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH MED., FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
TALLEVAST
CANCER
REVIEW
7
(2008),
available
at
http://www.myfloridaeh.com/medicine/superfund/tallevastcancerrevie
w.pdf.
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homeowners in the four-street, all African American
Diamond neighborhood, suffered sickness and worry as
some of their homes stood twenty-five feet from the
chemical plant fence line.10 For more than a decade, Shell
Oil refused their requests for relocation.11
These three fence line fights, centered in little
known hamlets hundreds of miles apart, serve as striking
case studies of how working class communities of color—
imperiled by pollution and seemingly neglected by
regulators—must take the law in to their own hands. In
each case, the residents turned to the courts for justice.
They filed lawsuits against big industry as their last hope
for relief—seeking relocation from these dangerous fence
lines.12 The legal results in these cases ultimately
brought some measures of relief, but the respective
journeys in Ponca City, Tallevast, and Norco were
hindered by delays and difficulties.
In Louisiana, Diamond residents lost their court
case against Shell Oil in 1997.13 Yet the legal case helped
re-energize their quest for relief and attracted aggressive
grassroots activists to their cause. Five years later, in
2002, the Diamond community cemented a historic
relocation pact with the Fortune 500 Company.14 This
settlement
was
among
the
most
noteworthy
environmental justice verdicts for generations.
The Ponca Tribe of Indians in Oklahoma secured a
$10.5 million settlement with the Continental Carbon
Company, the world’s fourth largest carbon black
manufacturer, in 2009 the case was filed in U.S. District
See generally Death Toll up to 6 in Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1988, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/07/us/death-tollup-to-6-in-blast.html.
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GREENE, NIGHT FIRE, supra note 1, at 7.
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Id.

Ponca Tribe of Indians v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 439 F. Supp.
1171 (W.D. Okla. 2006); Ward v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2008 WL
8188990 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 2008) (Trial Order); Richards v. Shell
Oil Co., 1993 WL 541525 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 1993).
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Richards, WL 541525.
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GREENE, NIGHT FIRE, supra note 1, at 223.
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Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.15 This
instance was one of four community lawsuits settled with
industry within the past six years. Tallevast residents
secured an out of court settlement in 2010 with Fortune
500 Company Lockheed Martin on their main property
contamination lawsuit.16 The settlement of this lawsuit
was one of four legal cases the community filed after
learning of the pollution plume.
As a journalist and author, I spent years
researching the stories in Louisiana, Florida and
Oklahoma, talking with people on the ground, pulling
environmental inspection reports and reviewing the legal
papers filed in each case. As an investigative journalist
for The Center for Public Integrity, a nonprofit
investigative news center in Washington, I described
Ponca City’s travails with carbon black in 2011.17 As an
investigative journalist with The Miami Herald for a
decade before that, I explored Tallevast’s plight with
Lockheed Martin and TCE.18 As an author, I detailed
Diamond’s struggle with Shell in my narrative nonfiction
book, Night Fire: Big Oil, Poison Air, and Margie
Richard’s Fight to Save Her Town.19
The three seemingly unrelated cases, my research
shows, actually hold much in common. For instance, in
each case, citizens pressed for reform in the courts
because they believed government wasn’t fully protecting
them and industry was not responsive to their concerns.

Continental Carbon, 439 F. Supp. at 1171; see also Ponca
Tribe of Indians v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 2009 WL 2836508 (W.D. Okla.
Jul. 30, 2009) (hereinafter Ponca Settlement).

15

Timothy Wolfrum, Tallevast Residents, Lockheed Martin
Settle
Suit,
BRADENTON.COM,
(Sept.
4,
2010)
http://www.bradenton.com/2010/09/04/2552125/tallevast-residentslockheed-martin.html
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Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.

See Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1; see also
Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1, and Greene, Residents,
Lockheed, supra note 1. TCE is the chemical compound,
trichloroethylene.
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GREENE, NIGHT FIRE, supra note 1.
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In short, the people had to find justice themselves, not
depend on industry or government.
Furthermore, each legal case led to steps forward—
either directly or indirectly. In Ponca City, the four cases
produced settlements and helped fence line residents
nearest the carbon plant move to new homes.
In
Tallevast, the prime lawsuit landed a settlement
agreeable to most in the plaintiff class. In Norco, the
legal case was lost, but the trial’s publicity attracted
advocates that helped the neighborhood ultimately move
away from the fence line.
Moreover, successes came only after hurdles,
frustrations and setbacks.
Each community had to
overcome significant obstacles and wait years to secure
progress. Ponca City homeowners complained to state
regulators for more than a decade about pollution before
finally turning to the courts. Norco residents pushed
Shell for more than a decade to fund relocation and lost
their court case before resolution came. In Tallevast,
despite the lawsuit settlement, residents still await an
industry-funded relocation as they suffer through a
decades-long cleanup and dwindling property values.
Most significantly, big industry had placed its
plants, and thus its pollutants, in blue collar communities
of low income, of color, or both. Ultimately, these cities
showcase that fence line communities can fight back.
But, as these case studies show, cities in similar
situations should not expect success to arrive quickly, or
easily.
This article will summarize each community’s story
from my point of view as an investigative journalist. The
lessons revealed in Oklahoma, Florida, and Louisiana
carry resonance for any community battling big industry,
environmental hazards, and seemingly indifferent
regulators.
II.

PONCA CITY, OKLAHOMA.

In this city of 25,000 two hours upstate of
Oklahoma City, the air pollution was so prevalent
residents could touch it: on their hands, their shoes, their
pets, their clothes, their children’s toys. For more than a
decade, residents filled the local Department of
Environmental Quality office with complaints so vast they
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took twenty binders to hold.20 The complaints, some
coming from members of the Ponca Tribe of Indians living
nearest the plant, cited Continental Carbon Co.,
manufacturer of carbon black, a product used in tires,
rubber and plastic goods.21 The plant manufactures
carbon black from petroleum refinery residual oil, and the
finished substance is a form of almost pure carbon
classified as a possible carcinogen.22
Homeowners complained their dogs’ feet turned
black walking through town, and that their white tennis
shoes changed color.23 Yet, records reveal that the state’s
own policies hampered efforts to curb the pollution; for
many years, the Oklahoma Department of Environmental
Quality would file a citation and seek fines against
Continental Carbon only if its inspectors actually
witnessed the “fugitive dust” leaving the plant.24
Evidence of black dust found on residents’ property was
not enough. “They said as they interviewed people and
took complaints, unless it happened while they were
here—and it didn’t—it didn’t happen. They didn’t have
the resources to take samples and to go back and test it,”
Richard Stone, the city’s former mayor, stated.25
For a time in 2003, overrun with complaints, the
state regulatory agency told residents it could no longer
send inspectors to visit homes.26 Even after inspectors
20

Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.
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Carbonblack.org, supra note 3.

See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
OCCUPATIONAL AND SAFETY GUIDELINE FOR CARBON BLACK POTENTIAL
HUMAN CARCINOGEN (1988),
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/81123/pdfs/0102.pdf
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Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.

The author researched the Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality records and conducted interviews.
See
Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.
24

Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. The
author was informed of this as he researched Ponca City’s plight for
The Center for Public Integrity’s national series on air pollution,
Poisoned Places.
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Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.
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turned out again, complaints continued to pour in. “They
just really ignored us, and got mad when we told them
they were ignoring us,” Jesse Beck, environmental
manager for the Ponca Tribe of Indians, said of state
regulators.27
State inspectors often spotted black particulate
matter on residents’ property. But the cases nearly
always ended there, without a citation against industry,
the Center’s review of 726 citizen complaints logged from
1993 to 2011 revealed.28 State regulators said they were
diligent, taking action as their rules allowed. Houstonbased Continental Carbon, Ponca City’s third largest
employer, blamed other sources for the pollution and said
it spent millions to reduce emissions.29 “Any issues that
are identified in the plant operation are immediately
addressed,” Dennis Hetu, Continental Carbon’s recently
appointed president, told me.30 He said the company puts
environmental compliance behind only safety.
But the people, fed up, had enough. “Living with
that plant was a complete nightmare,” resident Karen
Howe stated.31 Howe recalled moving into a 3-bedroom
house just across the fence from the plant. At the time,
she was a single mother. “The dust came into your home.
I couldn’t open my windows on the east side of the house
because it came in,” she said for my story for The Center
for Public Integrity.
I tried to get the kids a couple of pets, of
course they were outside dogs. As soon as
they were outside even three or four days
you couldn’t even pet them because your
hands would be all black. If they rubbed up
against you it would be black on your skin
and on your clothes.

27

Id.

The Center for Public Integrity, http://www.iwatchnews.org/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
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Files of the state environmental agency document
multiple plant breakdowns over the years that allowed
carbon dust to reach the air.32 For residents, it was a
frequent struggle with carbon black. “It was a constant
cleanup. It was bleach and water. It was always, bleach
and water,” said Jonathan Thomas, a father of three who
works for the Ponca Tribe of Indians. “You couldn’t have
white clothes. You just couldn’t have nothing nice.”
Scotty Simpson Jr., a member of the Ponca Tribe business
committee, said he’d wash his 1997 white Ford truck, only
to find it black the next day. A Dallas Cowboys fan,
Simpson proudly owned jersey #22—Hall of Fame
running back Emmitt Smith. He kept the jersey in a
plastic bag inside his house to protect it. When he went
out, he was careful not to touch anything. “Once you got
carbon black on it, it was done,” Simpson said.33
It took a string of lawsuit settlements before the
complaints finally began to ebb. The first two cases were
filed in 2005, one by town residents, businesses and City
Hall, and another by the Ponca Tribe of Indians.34 In
2006, the plant settled with City Hall for $400,000 and
residents for about $8 million. In 2009, Continental
Carbon Co. paid a $10.5 million settlement to the Tribe.
Residents filed a third case in 2007 against Continental
Carbon and refinery ConocoPhillips, a case settled in
2010. A fourth case, brought by homeowners in 2009,
reached an $800,000 settlement. Each time, Continental
Carbon denied that it caused the pollution but said it
settled the cases to move its business forward.
In all, the cases settled for some $20 million.35 The
extent of state fines in the same period: $25,437.36 As the
cases moved through the courts, emissions went down and
The author reviewed thousands of pages of Citizen
Complaints about carbon black on file at the Oklahoma Department
of Environmental Quality offices in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
during field research in 2011. The files, catalogued by year as
Complaints, were contained in 20 binders.
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See Continental Carbon, 439 F. Supp. at 1171.
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Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.
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citizen complaints did, too. In 2006, the state Department
of Environmental Quality changed its policy on fugitive
dust ”from having to see it cross the property line,” an
agency spokeswoman said, “to if there is clear evidence of
fugitive dust crossing the property line, such as dust on
cars.”37 That change came a year after the first two
lawsuits were filed.
In 2009, the year of the $10.5 million settlement,
plant emissions reported to EPA dropped drastically.38 In
the $10.5 million settlement, the Ponca Nation received a
$320,595 check, and individual homeowners received
thousands.39 Lawyers, who logged almost $1.8 million in
expenses and 15,000 hours, received 40 percent.40 The
largest individual payouts went to 11 homeowners living
closest to the plant; the carbon company spent $300,000
each to move them to new homes.41

37

Id.; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:100-29-2(c)1 (2012):
(c) Emission boundaries.
(1) No person shall cause or allow the
discharge of any visible fugitive dust
emissions beyond the property line
of the property on which the emissions
originate in such a manner as to
damage or to interfere with the use of
adjacent properties. If the DEQ
determines that this rule has been
violated, the owner or operator of the
fugitive dust emissions source or
sources shall implement controls,
subject to economic and technological
feasibility,
to
prevent
future
violations.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.

39

Ponca Settlement, WL 2836508 *4.
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Id. at *3.

See Brian Daffron, Ponca Nation Gets $10.5 million
Settlement
in
Environmental
Lawsuit,
(Oct.
1,
2009)
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2009/10/01/p
onca-nation-gets-10-5-million-settlement-in-environmental-lawsuit83863.
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Today, the ground is covered with grass. “I almost
blame the government for allowing those homes to even
be there. They should never have been built there,”
plaintiff Amos Hinton stated.42 A descendant of Ponca
Chief Standing Buffalo, Hinton said he even spotted black
residue at the gravesite. “My interest was to stop the
polluting on my family’s land—the desecration of this
man’s burial site,” he said.43
While residents still occasionally cite carbon black,
the level of complaints has dipped tremendously.44 In
Ponca City, change, residents and community leaders say,
is in the air.
III.

TALLEVAST, FLORIDA.

A long-closed plant anchors one end of this small
blue collar town, and the main drag, Tallevast Road, is
without sidewalks.45 Yet, a small town atmosphere
pervades this hamlet near Bradenton, Florida. News
spreads from house to house, neighbors are often related,
and most of the eighty homes exude the stability of its
working-class inhabitants.
Environmental contamination threatens to destroy
the heritage of this historic black town.
In an
environmental drama that has played out for more than a
decade, the residents are pitted against giant defense
contractor Lockheed Martin, Manatee County, and the
state of Florida. The problem begins at the former
American Beryllium Company plant at 1600 Tallevast
Road, across the street from a community church.46

42

Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.
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Id.
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Id.

The author writes as to his personal recollections as he visited
Tallevast, Florida as an investigative reporter for THE MIAMI HERALD.
See Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1; see also Greene,
Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1; see also Greene, Residents,
Lockheed, supra note 1.
45

American Beryllium Corporation was purchased by Lockheed
Martin in 1996. See Florida Department of Health, DOH Timeline of
Activities Around Former American Beryllium Site, Tallevast
Community,

46
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Opened in 1961 and closed in 1996, the plant
manufactured machine parts for nuclear weapons using
beryllium-containing metals. Workers inhaled hazardous
dust and handled a toxic degreaser that cleaned machine
parts.
In January 2000, as it prepared to sell the plant it
had recently purchased, Lockheed Martin discovered a
leak of solvents from those degreasers.47 The leaching,
state officials say, could have begun thirty-eight years
earlier.48 The company told the county and state, which
discovered an underground plume seeping 200 acres in a
town of 1.5 square miles, where some residents still drank
and showered from well water.49 The main hazard was
TCE, a cancer-causing chemical used in the degreaser
that had drawn attention in the book A Civil Action.50
Tallevast residents were not informed of the
contamination, but discovered it by chance more than
three years later, in September 2003. “Why didn't anyone
tell us?” Cassandra 'Casey' Brice, whose grandfather cofounded the town’s Bryant Chapel Christian Methodist
Episcopal Church, asked as I sat at her kitchen table one
morning in 2010. Brice became the town’s unofficial
historian, clipping every article about the contamination.
Both of Brice's parents died after bouts with cancer.
She worried her mother's death was linked to the
pollution. “All these years we were drinking the water
and not knowing it was contaminated,” Brice told me as I
investigated the community’s struggle for The Miami
Herald. The pollution’s discovery killed property values
and sparked worries that any deaths, cancers, and cases
of the deadly lung disease Berylliosis51 were linked to the

http://www.doh.state.fl.us/environment/community/SUPERFUND/ha
zwastework/currenttimeline.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
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Id.

48

Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1.

49

Id.

50

JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).

Berylliosis is lung inflammation caused by the inhalation of
dust or fumes that contain the metallic element beryllium.
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plant. Affixing stick pins on a board, residents count
more than eighty cancer cases over three decades.52
Now, deeply rooted homeowners are desperate for
Lockheed Martin to pay to move them out. The company
refuses, saying the contamination has been capped and
citing a 2005 opinion from a Florida Department of
Health doctor that there is no “imminent” health threat.53
“Had we been shown that there was a pathway between
those groundwater contaminants and the community,
that decision may have been different,” said Lockheed
spokesman Gary Cambre, who said the company is
committed to rebuilding Tallevast. “It's not like Lockheed
can't afford to relocate us,” said lifelong resident Beverly
Bradley, the sister of Casey Brice. “The money they spent
over the years to fight us, they could have relocated us
and we would be over this.”
Like others, Bradley is torn.
She loves her
hometown—but believes she must flee for a community
uncluttered by pollution, dwindling property values and
health fears. Her sister shares the view. “They expect us
to live here all the rest of our lives on this toxic plume,”
said Brice. “It was such a vibrant, close-knit community
before this happened.”
Residents filed four lawsuits, engaging their
campaign from their grassroots headquarters: a squat
one-story white building across the street from the former
plant. The community is getting help from the School of
Law at Barry University in Orlando, which has closely
examined Lockheed Martin's decades-long cleanup plan
filed with the state. Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben,
Director of Barry University's Earth Advocacy Clinic, told
me the case represents one of the most complex
contamination cleanups in recent Florida history.
A.

Town History

Tallevast was once blanketed with longleaf slash
pine trees that lured laborers from Georgia and the
52

Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1.

Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1; see also MANATEE
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSION MINUTES 6 (2005), available
at
http://clerkofcircuitcourt.com/boardrecords/Minutes/BccMinutes/BCC
MINUTES20050201DOC001.PDF.
53
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Carolinas. The thousands who trekked to this hamlet at
the turn of the 19th century built small homes and
turpentined for village founder J.H. Tallevast. The men
slashed the 100 foot pines to extract the resin, then boiled
the sticky, brownish-yellow fluid and loaded the
turpentine into barrels. The railroad line was extended
here so tons of turpentine could be shipped north.
In 1948, with turpentining becoming a memory, the
Visioneering Company opened an engineering plant on
Tallevast Road. In 1960, the company became American
Beryllium, a subsidiary of Loral Corporation.54 American
Beryllium (ABC) shifted its headquarters just up the
road. At 1600 Tallevast Road, the ABC plant opened in
the early 1960s to manufacture nuclear reactors and
weapons. Former janitor Morris Robinson said he cleaned
out tanks holding a colorless solution. “I had to hold my
breath,” Robinson, a third-generation homeowner, told
me. “And I would have to step out of the room, get fresh
air, hold it, and go back in and finish up.”55
In 1996, after the plant closed, Lockheed Martin
bought the property as part of a $9.1 billion purchase of
many of the assets of owner Loral Corp. At purchase, it
did not conduct an environmental review. A year later, as
Lockheed began the process of selling the site, it did.
By January 2000, the company discovered a leak of
trichloroethylene, TCE, a cancer risk in drinking water
that can remain in groundwater for long periods.56 Other
hazards found include 1,4-dioxane, an industrial chemical
that can affect the central nervous system and forms
contamination plumes in groundwater, and the chemical
tetrachloroethylene, a cancer-causing agent.
As the owner of the property when the leak was
discovered, Lockheed Martin was liable for its cleanup. It
shared its findings with Florida and Manatee County
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
TALLEVAST COMMUNITY, TALLEVAST, MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
PRELIMINARY CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT REPORT 2 (2004),
available
at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/waste/quick_topics/publications/wc/Talleva
st/TallevastCommunity.pdf.
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TCE is the chemical compound, trichloroethylene.
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officials and, in September 2001, 538 tons of tainted soil
was excavated.
Evidence I examined showed that
contamination leaked into the community.57 A 2001 state
review said organic compounds “may be migrating offsite.” In 2002, Florida officials “raised concerns about
potential impacts to off-site private wells.” Residents
were told nothing. Why didn't the state inform the
community? “I don't believe we had a regulation,” a
spokeswoman with the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection told me in 2008, when I first
wrote of Tallevast.58
One afternoon in September 2003, resident Laura
Ward peered out her window to find a rig drilling on her
land. “You don't know, but the water is contaminated
here,” a worker told her.59 “We're putting in monitoring
wells in your community because the water is
contaminated.” Finally, the community was getting wind
of what was in its groundwater. A few weeks later, Ward
and a neighbor huddled with a Lockheed Martin executive
at the Mount Tabor Missionary Baptist Church. “There's
some TCE in the water,” he said. “We don't think it's very
far
off
site.”
In truth, the documented size of the plume kept
growing. In one spot, the TCE concentration was 10,000
times above state standards.60 Elsewhere, the state found
TCE where the company hadn’t. The discovery came just
as Ward and others founded a nonprofit—Family
Oriented Community United Strong (FOCUS)—in hopes
of luring quality low-cost housing and new businesses to
Tallevast. Their revival dreams were buried with the
See Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1; see also
Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1, and Greene, Residents,
Lockheed, supra note 1.
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Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1.
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Id.

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection has set
the Florida drinking water standard for trichoroethene (TCE) is 3
micrograms per liter of water. See FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
CHEMICALS IN PRIVATE DRINKING WELLS FACT SHEET 1 (2005),
available
at
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/environment/programs/chemical_fact_sheet
s/Trichloroethylene_FS.pdf.
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plume, but the residents prompted a state law that
requires polluters to notify communities within thirty
days. It is called the Tallevast Bill.61
In September 2010, a decade after the leak’s
discovery, the community and company agreed to settle a
property contamination lawsuit brought by 270 residents
against companies that owned or operated the plant.62
For residents, a fuller victory remains elusive: relocation
to new homes.
Today, the village remains an
environmental testing ground, with 275 wells monitoring
the plume, sprinklers turned off so as not to spread
pollution and worry about the future. “Everything I've
done, everything I've worked for, is all for nothing,” said
Robinson, a father of three and Bradenton city worker.63
IV.

NORCO, LOUISIANA.

In August 1973, a leak from a Shell Chemical plant
in Norco, Louisiana caught fire with a lawnmower being
pushed by a 16-year-old, Leroy Jones. The explosion set
him afire, taking his life, and catapulted a 72-year-old
woman, Helen Washington, from her home into the street.
She, too, was killed.64
In May 1988, at 3:30 in the morning, a cataclysmic
explosion from a Shell refinery, on the other side of the
four-street Diamond neighborhood, killed seven workers
inside the plant, turned night into day, and triggered
tremors thirty-five miles away.65 The explosions seared
fear in the Diamond, a small community sandwiched
between the chemical plant and refinery. Some homes
See FLA. STAT. § 376.30702 (2011). The bill required that
within 30 days after receipt of actual notice from the person
responsible for site rehabilitation, the Department of Environmental
Protection must notify the mayor, the city manager, all real property
owners, tenants, and essentially everyone affected, of the
contamination.
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stood just twenty-five feet from the chemical plant’s fence
line.
A year after the second explosion, Diamond
residents gathered inside the quaint Masonic meeting
hall and spoke of the smoke, deaths, and worries.66 That
evening in 1989, the community officially formed the
Norco Relocation Committee. Margie Richard, a single
mother and public school teacher living in a trailer home
abutting the chemical plant, was named president.
The dues were $2 for the elderly, $5 for others.
Their target: a company so rich with crude it turned $1.5
million in worldwide profit each hour.67 The residents
prayed before each meeting and put aside the small group
dues to pay for homemade picket signs of protest.68
Margie had her neighbors record their list of goals.
Number one: relocation from Diamond. Also on the list: a
right to a long life, cleaner air and less noise, deduction of
the flare from the chemical plant’s smokestacks, and,
getting Shell to talk to them like neighbors.
The last goal wasn’t easy. “They would sit there
and listen, and they would say, ‘We’ll consider it,’” Wilma
Subra, a Louisiana chemist who studied Norco, told me as
I researched my book, Night Fire.69 “But there was never
a response back, ‘Well, we agree to do this.’”
On October 5, 1993, tired of inaction, the
community went to court.
Richards vs. Shell Oil
Company was filed in the courthouse at the Parish of St.
Charles, on Highway 18 in Hahnville.70 Someone initially
labeled the case “Richards vs. Shell,” but Margie Richard
was lead plaintiff representing the interests of likeminded residents.71
The legal claim identified the nature of the injuries
as “negligence, reckless and wanton misconduct, strict
liability, nuisance, trespass, battery, intentional infliction
66
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of emotional distress, [and] negligence in the conduct of
ultra-hazardous activity.”72 The Diamond lawyers sought
a verdict awarding enough money for residents to reap
their ultimate goal of moving out.
The 25-page complaint stated that the “air
breathed by the plaintiff . . . is contaminated,” and alleged
“[p]hysical, economic and psychological” harm to the
community.73 It said the plant’s emissions dropped the
market value in Diamond while tainting the air, food, and
water.74 “Indeed, there is no safe threshold level of
exposure to many of the chemicals emitted from the Shell
facility.”75
The lawyers wanted the courts to shut the chemical
plant down, “enjoining Shell from further use of said
facility . . . and decreeing that in default of Shell removing
said facility, that the Sheriff of St. Charles Parish be
directed to remove the same at the expense of the
defendant, Shell.”76 Shell’s corporate and legal strategy
was simple. “If they felt they were not wrong on these
issues, they would fight the lawsuit,” one Shell official
told me.77 Shell did that, challenging the case on every
count and contending the plant caused little, if any, harm.
On March 28, 1994, Margie Richard was deposed
by Shell’s lawyers.78 Her description of the plant’s harm
to the community could not be more plain-spoken. “Do
you have any particular evidence that would support any
claim that you and the two hundred and eighty or so odd
members are being treated any differently than, say,
people that live on the north side of Norco?” the Shell
lawyer asked her, according to the court deposition. She
replied,
GREENE, NIGHT FIRE, supra note 1, at 73; original Complaint
on file with author.
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The only evidence that we have that may not be
concrete is what we walk through and live
through daily . . . .” “It’s like we’re forgotten.
It’s like, let us die. I mean, look, that noise and
that flaring is bad. It shakes your house. The
evidence is our dishes rattling in the cabinet,
doors shake.” “The evidence, it’s like people on
our street die.79
In April 1997, as the case continued to wind its way
through the courts, researchers from the Deep South
Center for Environmental Justice, based at nearby Xavier
University in New Orleans, published a survey of the
community’s health.80
Over thirty-five percent of
husbands and wives reported having chest pains or
respiratory congestion, and their children reported
troubling rates of asthma (thirty-five percent) and
bronchitis (twenty-eight percent).81 More than one-fourth
of respondents reported suffering itching, burning eyes.82
Also common were blurred vision, ear itches, ringing in
the ears, sinus infections, and persistent coughs.
The Diamond lawyers never put the Xavier study
into evidence, however. Instead, they relied on other
evidence including state pollution reports and residents’
testimony. Each side hired experts. In August 1997,
twenty-four years to the month after Helen Washington
and Leroy Jones died in the streets, the jurors spoke. The
one-sentence question atop their jury verdict form had
asked: “[d]o you find that the operation of the Defendant’s
facility is a nuisance within the legal meaning of those
terms as explained in the instructions?”
A large X was marked in the box for “No” to the
question, and the jurors voted 10-2 in favor of Shell. With
that, jurors didn’t have to consider what amount of
damages should be awarded. There were no damages.
The international conglomerate had won. Residents lost
79
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the case, yet the lawsuit brought attention to the
Diamond community—attracting environmental activists
to town. And then more scares unfolded.
On December 8, 1998, at just after eight in the
morning, a highly flammable chemical began to overheat
inside a 5,000 gallon Shell tank in the plant’s batch resins
unit.83 Shell employees sweated furiously, laboring to
lower the tank’s temperature before it exploded.84 The
incident commander ordered the Norco Elementary
School, a half mile away, sealed shut.85
Teachers
dispersed water and towels, instructing the quarantined
children to cover their noses.
Three-and-one-half hours later, the alert was called
off.
The chemical bomb in the making had been
contained, and frantic parents rushed into Norco
Elementary to pull their children out. The near explosion
empowered more action. Residents started capturing
plant air emissions in an EPA-approved five-gallon
bucket, and then sent the results for testing. The “Bucket
Brigade” documented evidence of pollution and harm that
regulators had long overlooked.
Finally, Shell buckled. In a historic reversal on
June 11, 2002, Shell offered to buy the entire Diamond
community: Washington, Cathy, Diamond, and East
streets. The company now offered $80,000 minimum for
an owner-occupied house and $50,000 for a mobile home—
nearly four times what it had been paying in a longentrenched policy of paying market value. Shell assigned
new faces to negotiate with Diamond, and the results
showed.
Margie Richard, the community leader, was
thankful the relocation pact was approved during her
lifetime. Margie’s older sister, Naomi, had died years
earlier from a rare lung disease often linked to
environmental hazards.86 “I want to cry tears,” Margie
said after the homes were bought out. “Tears of joy.”87
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Diamond residents succeeded, but it took nearly 30
years—from the first explosion that August day of 1973—
to achieve their justice.
V.

CONCLUSION

In each community, my reporting found, common
sense justice was squarely on the residents' side. In
Ponca City, Oklahoma, residents woke up many mornings
to find black smudge on their homes and their clothes,
and hundreds of times, they turned to state regulators to
help them. The complaints piled up, and the pollution
continued, unstopped, until Native Americans and other
residents turned to the courts.
In Tallevast, Florida, residents were not
responsible for the underground leak of chemicals—a
former plant was—yet they were kept in the dark about
the pollution, once it was discovered, by government and
industry. To longtime homeowners, neither the county
nor the state of Florida came to their rescue, and today,
more than a decade after the leak's discovery, residents
still find themselves pushing Lockheed Martin to fund a
relocation from the underground plume.
In Norco, Louisiana, the Diamond residents had
full grounds for concern; some of the resident’s homes
stood just twenty-five feet from the fence line of the Shell
Chemical plant. In Louisiana today, homes must be at
least 2,000 feet from such potentially harmful facilities,
but Diamond's residences took root before that law was on
the books. Residents witnessed neighbors die in the
street, workers die at the refinery, and counted troubling
rates of sickness in their homes. Yet, they felt regulators
were not protecting them, and it took a protracted legal
battle against a giant corporation to finally free them
from harm's way.
Diamond’s justice—achieved only after decades of
struggle—is symptomatic of the larger struggles working
class communities of color face when battling big industry
and ineffectual regulators.
The crusades waged in
Oklahoma, Florida and Louisiana show that residents
must dig for truths with their own hands, wiping away
United States, yet in Norco there are at least five known cases in
fewer than five hundred people of color.” Id.
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black particulate matter in Oklahoma, digging into the
tainted groundwater in Florida, or capturing air in fivegallon buckets in Louisiana. Only with this evidence,
literally gathered in their own hands, right on the fencelines, can seemingly powerless communities achieve
power and attain the justice they seek. Industry and local
government, these case studies demonstrate, will not
hand it to them.
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